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I. INTRODUCTION 
The trial of a personal-injury case to a jury is fraught with 
uncertainty. Uncertainty stems from whether the plaintiff will prevail 
(and whether the jury will find the defendant at fault) and the amount of 
damages. Personal injuries, such as a broken ankle or a busted knee, do 
not translate well into specific dollar awards. Awarding a sum of 
money for a personal injury is firmly rooted in the law and is the only 
means available to compensate the plaintiff for a loss. These means are 
entrusted to the jury beginning at jury selection and continuing 
throughout the trial. 
Several consequences stem from the inability to translate a 
personal injury into a specific dollar award. The first consequence is 
that plaintiffs with roughly comparable injuries may receive less or 
more damages than others who are similarly situated due to the 
propensity of juries in one region to make either less or more generous 
awards. But there is little justification to support awarding either less or 
more compensation for an injury just because the claim is brought in 
one part of the state instead of another. 
Further, awarding unequal compensation for what is essentially the 
same injury does not make sense from an institutional viewpoint. 
Indeed, any significant variability in the award of damages may make 
the settlement of claims more difficult, especially when dealing with 
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) willing to run the risk of an adverse verdict 
for the chance at a generous damage award. Moreover, a system in 
which the prospect of an award of damages that is disproportionate to 
the injury sustained does not promote the fair and efficient resolution of 
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1
Cole: Charging the Jury on Damages in Personal-Injury Cases: How New Yo
Published by SURFACE, 2004
2 Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 31: 1 
claims. 
Currently, trial lawyers may address the jury on the amount of 
damages that it should award. These submissions provide the jury with 
some guidance on what is fair and just compensation for the injuries 
claimed in the case. But these submissions are not enough. The trial 
judge also should suggest to the jury what is reasonable compensation 
for the plaintiffs injury, albeit by giving the jury a band or range within 
which awards would be fair and just compensation. 
The range method is currently used by English courts in 
defamation and other civil cases tried to a jury. As applied in England, 
the process results in juries making like awards for like injuries in like 
cases and thus smoothes out the variability inherent in different juries' 
making awards in different cases involving what is essentially the same 
injury. New York trial judges should apply the English approach to the 
trial of personal-injury cases and give the jury a bracket within which it 
may make an award of damages. 
II. NEW YORK PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES 
The right to a trial by jury in a civil case is governed by the New 
York Constitution, which provides that "[t]rial by jury in all cases in 
which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision 
shall remain inviolate forever."1 The New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rules also governs and provides that the "issues of fact shall be tried by 
a jury" in "an action in which a party demands and sets forth facts 
which would permit a judgment for a sum of money only."2 These 
provisions cover the trial of almost all personal-injury negligence claims 
in which equitable relief is not requested because they inevitably seek a 
"sum of money only. "3 
The vast majority of personal-injury cases in New York are 
decided by a jury. But they are not tried in such as way that the jury 
receives any meaningful guidance on what the plaintiffs personal injury 
is worth. Instead, it receives direction on the plaintiffs lost earnings, 
medical expenses, or other financial losses. 
Instructing a Jury on Damages in a Typical Personal-Injury Case 
The trial judge's instructions to the jury, in a typical personal-
injury case, provide the jury with no real guidance on the amount of 
1. N.Y. CONST. art. I,§ 2; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101[1] (McKinney 1992). 
2. Id. 
3. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101 (McKinney 1992). 
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damages that should be awarded solely for the plaintiffs injury. 
Typically, a charge on damages begins with the admonition that the 
instructions on "damages must not be taken as a suggestion that [the 
jury] should find for the plaintiff."4 The trial judge then tells the jury, 
"If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, 
you must render a verdict in a sum of money that will justly and fairly 
compensate the plaintiff for all losses resulting from the injuries [he] 
sustained. "5 
In the usual case, the injury claimed by the plaintiff will have 
caused pain and suffering. The judge will instruct the jury as follows: 
If you decide that defendant is liable, plaintiff is entitled to recover a 
sum of money which will justly and fairly compensate [him] for any 
injury and conscience pain and suffering to date caused by defendant. 
Conscience pain and suffering means pain and suffering of which 
there was some level of awareness by plaintiff. 6 
If the plaintiff has testified to a loss of enjoyment of life, the trial judge 
will supplement the charge with further instructions. 7 
The jury will not be told what the plaintiffs injury is worth. In 
closing arguments to the jury, attorneys may suggest what amount of 
damages should be awarded. 8 But the suggested amount of damages 
must fall within the amount demanded in the complaint and must not 
misrepresent the way in which the jury should arrive at its award.9 This 
is the extent of instruction the jurors will receive on the value of an 
injury. 
Absent guidance on what an injury is worth, it is not surprising that 
part of a civil case is devoted to whether the jury's award is either 
inadequate or excessive. 10 This examination of fair and just 
compensation for the claimed injuries occurs only after the jury has 
returned its verdict. By instructing the jury on a permissible range of 
awards, jurors are able to make an informed decision that more 
4. Pattern Jury Instructions 2:277 [hereinafter P.J.I.]. 
5. Id. 
6. P.J.I. 2:280. 
7. P.J.I. 2:280.1. 
8. Tate v. Colabello, 445 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (N.Y. 1983); Baker v. Shepard, 715 
N.Y.S.2d 83, 86-87 (App. Div. 2000). 
9. Acunto v. Conklin, 687 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (App. Div. 1999). See Stangl v. 
Compass Transp., 635 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995) (stating that trial counsel may 
not suggest "that the measure of damages should be based on the jurors' experience and 
financial status"); DeCicco v. Methodist Hosp., 424 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 1980) 
(asserting that counsel may not use time-unit argument). 
10. See David D. Siegel, New York Civil Practice§ 407 (3d. ed. 1999). 
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accurately corresponds to the injury sustained by the plaintiff. 
Review of Jury Awards under Section 5501 (c) of the Civil Practice Law 
and Rules 
Judicial review of the inadequacy or excessiveness of a jury's 
verdict in New York is conducted indirectly. The right to a jury trial in 
actions at law is guaranteed by the New York State Constitution. I I To 
protect the right to a jury trial, a court reviewing a jury's award of 
damages for inadequacy or excessiveness may not alter the amount. 12 
Instead, the court's sole power is to grant a new trial unless, as the case 
may be, the defendant stipulates to an increased award or the plaintiff 
stipulates to a decreased award. I3 Absent such a stipulation, the court is 
limited to granting a retrial. 
Requiring consent to either an increase or a reduction in a jury's 
award of damages as a means of preserving the right to a trial by jury is 
close to a legal fiction. Were a party to refuse to consent to the increase 
of an award against it (or the decrease of an award in its favor), the 
party would be forced to retry its claim. If the second jury were to 
make the same award, the court would grant another trial, absent a 
stipulation to the greater or lesser amount already set by the court. If 
the second jury returned a different award, the court likely would grant 
a new trial if the award was less (or more) than the amount previously 
stipulated by the court. 
A defendant, or plaintiff, faced with an order granting a new trial, 
unless it stipulates to an increased (or reduced) award of damages, has 
every incentive to agree to the stipulation. Moreover, a party that is 
dissatisfied with the trial judge's conditional order granting a new trial 
runs a risk by taking an appeal. In the event that either party appeals, 
the appellate division may reinstate the jury's award or decrease the 
award to an amount not less than that in the verdict. 14 The traditional 
rule in New York was that a court could not set aside a jury's verdict on 
damages unless the jury's award was so inadequate or excessive as to 
11. See N.Y. CONST. art. I,§ 2. 
12. Siegel, supra note 10, at 658. ("[T]he court cannot raise or lower the sum directly, 
at least not in personal injury and like cases involving unliquidated damages, because the 
setting of damages is strictly a jury function"). 
13. Id. ("[T]he court can grant a new trial 'unless' the defendant stipulates to a higher 
sum ('additur') or the plaintiff stipulates to a lower one ('remittitur')."). 
14. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(a)[5] (McKinney Supp. 2003) ("[W]hen the final judgment 
was entered in a different amount pursuant to the respondent's stipulation on a motion to set 
aside the verdict as excessive or inadequate; the appellate court may increase such judgment 
to a sum not exceeding the verdict or reduce it to a sum not less than the verdict"). 
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"shock the conscience of the court."15 The practical effect of this 
standard was that a jury's award of damages would not result in 
granting of a new trial unless the award greatly exceeded (or fell below) 
any award that a reasonable jury might return. Court-ordered changes 
to juries' verdicts did occur, however seldom. 
Recognition in the early 1980s that juries were awarding damages 
out of proportion to the injuries sustained in personal-injury and similar 
tort actions led the New York Legislature to alter the standard under 
which a court determined whether an award was either inadequate or 
excessive. 16 The former shocks-the-conscience-of-the-court" standard 
was replaced in 1986 by a statutory command that in personal-injury 
(and some other) actions "the appellate division shall determine that an 
award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what 
would be reasonable compensation."17 The statute as drafted only 
empowered the appellate division to test the inadequacy or 
excessiveness of an award by asking whether it deviated materially 
from reasonable compensation. 18 Courts soon construed the new 
statutory standard to apply to trial courts to avoid the anomalous 
situation in which the trial judge would apply a different standard from 
the appellate court in reviewing the adequacy of a jury's award. 19 
The legislative change in the standard of review did not affect the 
procedure that the court used to review the adequacy of the jury's 
award. The court could not substitute what it thought was a proper 
award for the jury's verdict. The court was limited to granting a new 
trial unless, in the case of an inadequate award, the defendant stipulated 
to an increased sum; or, in the case of an excessive award, the plaintiff 
stipulated to a reduced award.20 
15. See Christopher v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 565 N.E.2d 1266 (N.Y. 1990). 
16. See Memorandum of Governor Cuomo on Approving L. 1986, ch. 682, reprinted in 
1986 N.Y. Laws at 3182, 3184; see also Memorandum of Office of Court Administration on 
Law 1986, Toxic Torts Statute of Limitations, ch. 682, reprinted in 1986 N.Y. Laws 3392. 
17. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501 (McKinney Supp. 2003). Strictly speaking, the legislation 
applied to cases "in which an itemized verdict is required by rule forty-one hundred eleven" 
of the C.P.L.R. Id. Rule 4111, in tum, requires an itemized verdict in medical, dental, and 
podiatric malpractice actions, in actions against public employers, and in actions to recover 
damages for personal injuries, property damage, and wrongful death. Id. at 411 l(d)-(f). So 
review of damages awards by juries in those actions is subject to the deviates-materially-
from-reasonable-compensation standard. Id. 
18. C.P.L.R. 5501(c). 
19. See, e.g., Ashton v. Brobruitsky, 625 N.Y.S.2d 585, 586 (App. Div. 1995); Ramos 
v. New York, 565 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 577 N.E.2d 1060 (N.Y. 
1991). 
20. See, e.g., Ashton, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 587. 
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The legislative change in the standard of review for jury awards in 
personal-injury actions resulted in less reluctance by the courts to 
determine the reasonableness of a jury's award of damages. Baker v. 
Shepard is typical of hundreds of cases.21 In that action, the plaintiff, a 
passenger in a car, sued to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained in a motor-vehicle accident. 22 The plaintiff claimed that she 
"sustained a left humerus fracture that was slow to heal, cervical strain 
of the neck, impingement syndrome of the shoulder causing pain and a 
deformity that prevented her from fully extending her arm. "2 The jury 
found the defendant at fault and awarded the plaintiff $7500 for her past 
pain and suffering but made no award for future pain and suffering. 24 
The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict, and the trial judge ordered a 
new trial to determine the plaintiffs future pain and suffering.25 
On appeal, the Third Department rejected the defendant's 
contention that the trial judge improperly set aside the jury's verdict for 
future pain and suffering. 26 It reviewed the unopposed medical 
testimony presented by the plaintiffs physician and concluded that the 
jury's failure to award damages for future pain and suffering deviated 
materially from what would be reasonable compensation.27 Though the 
court could have substituted an award for the jury's failure to make one, 
it did not.28 The Third Department also held "that the jury's award of 
$7 ,500 for past pain and suffering did not deviate materially from what 
would be reasonable compensation. "29 
The Body of Judicial Evaluations of Personal-Injury Awards 
Since the legislature's amendment of the Civil Practice Law and 
Rules to provide for closer judicial scrutiny of awards by juries in 
personal-injury cases, the courts have decided many cases involving the 
inadequacy or excessiveness of monetary awards. Several publishers 
collect these decisions and make them available by subscription.30 By 
reviewing the decisions of the appellate divisions, it is not difficult to 
21. Baker v. Shepard, 715 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 2000). 
22. Id. at 84-85. 
23. Id. at 86. 
24. Id. at 85 . 
25. Id. 
26. Baker, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 86. 
27. Id. 
28. C.P.L.R. 5501(c). 
29. Baker, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 86. 
30. See New York Jury Verdict Reporter (Moran Publ'g Co.)(published weekly) and 
New York Judicial Review of Damages (Moran Publ'g Co.)(published monthly). 
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place an upper and lower limit on the damages that might be awarded 
for any personal injury. 
For example, the First Department ordered a new trial in a case 
involving a tom meniscus followed by two surgeries unless the 
defendant stipulated to increase the jury's award from $68,000 to 
$200,000.31 In another case involving a tom meniscus followed by two 
surgeries, the same court reversed a trial judge's granting a new trial 
unless the plaintiff stipulated to reduce the jury's award of damages 
from $600,000 to $225,000.32 These decisions support a reasonable-
compensation bracket of between $200,000 and $600,000 for a case 
involving a tom medial meniscus followed by two surgeries. 
This analysis of appellate-court decisions to set a reasonable-
compensation bracket consisting of an upper and lower limit for any 
injury can be performed for just about any injury. Indeed, lawyers in 
personal-injury cases devote much effort, both in the trial court and on 
appeal, contesting whether the jury's award of damages is either 
inadequate or excessive under the materially-deviates-from-reasonable-
compensation standard. 
The legal argument over reasonable compensation should take 
place before the trial judge instructs the jury so that the jury can be 
given guidance in the court's charge on what is reasonable 
compensation for the claimed injuries. The current English practice in 
jury trials is illustrative. How the English courts developed their 
approach is instructive. 
III. ENGLISH PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES 
Before 1854, all cases tried in England in the common-law courts 
were heard by a judge sitting with a jury.33 In that year, Parliament 
provided that a common-law action could be tried without a jury with 
the parties' consent.34 The reorganization of the courts during the 1870s 
to accommodate the merger of law and equity led to a decline in using 
juries in civil actions. 35 
31. See Juliano v. Prudential Sec., 731N.Y.S.2d142, 144 (App. Div. 2001). 
32. See Garcia v. Queens Surface Corp., 707 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 2000). 
33. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 210 
(Butterworth 5th ed. 1956) (The common law courts were Queen's Bench, Exchequer, and 
Common Pleas.); TERENCE INGMAN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROCESS,~ 7.6.1, at 219 (Oxford 
U. Press 8th ed. 2000). 
34. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Viet., c. 125, § 1 (Eng.); INGMAN, 
supra note 33, ~ 7.6.1, at 219. 
35. INGMAN, supra note 33, ~ 7.6.1, at 219. Specifically, section 57 of the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Act 1873 allowed the court to deny a trial by jury in civil cases that 
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The modem practice of restricting jury trials to claims for libel, 
slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and fraud may be 
traced to a shortage of jurors at the end of World War 1.36 The Rules of 
the Supreme Court had provided since 1883 that "except in a case of 
slander, libel, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction or 
breach of promise" a jury trial would be held only if ordered by the 
court. 37 The Juries Act 1918 then restricted jury trials to that class of 
cases, though the act allowed the court to order a jury trial if 
necessary. 38 After a handful of other enactments that extended and then 
restricted civil jury trials, in 1933 Parliament, "as part of a more general 
drive for cheaper litigation," limited jury trials in the High Court to 
cases based on either "a charge of fraud against that party" or "a claim 
in respect of libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, 
seduction or breach of promise of marriage. "39 The Supreme Court Act 
1981 currently governs a party's right to a jury trial and carries this 
scheme forward with the notable exception of claims for seduction and 
breach of promise, which have been abolished. 40 
The Supreme Court Act 1981 permits a judge in the Queen's 
Bench Division to order a jury trial in other cases, such as personal-
injury negligence actions.41 The Court of Appeal has so restricted the 
High Court's discretion to empanel a jury in negligence cases that, as a 
practical matter, jury trials are not held.42 Moreover, the overriding 
objective of the Civil Procedure Rules is to take up an appropriate share 
of the court's resources and deal with a case in a way that is 
required prolonged examination of accounts, documents, or scientific or local examination. 
See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Viet., c. 66, § 57 (Eng.). 
36. GEOFFREY WILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 181 
(1973). 
37. Id. 
38. See Juries Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 1 (Eng.). 
39. WILSON, supra note 36, at 181; see Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 6 (Eng.). 
40. See Supreme Court Act 1981, c. 54, § 69(1) (Eng.); see Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970, c. 33, §§ 1, 6 (Eng.). 
41. See Supreme Court Act 1981, c. 54, § 69(3). Section 69(3) of the act provides that 
"[a]n action to be tried in the Queen's Bench Division which does not by virtue of 
subsection (1) fall to be tried with a jury shall be tried without a jury unless the court in its 
discretion orders it to be tried with a jury." 
42. See INGMAN, supra note 33, ~ 7.6.3, at 221-23. Indeed, in the most recent judgment 
to deal with the trial judge's discretion to order a jury trial in a personal-injury action, the 
Court of Appeal commented that "no jury trial of a claim for personal injuries appears to 
have taken place for over 25 years." See H. v. Ministry of Defence, [1991] 2 Q.B. 103, 112 
(Eng. C.A. 1991). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against the trial judge's order 
directing a trial by jury and ordered a "trial by judge alone." Id. at 111-12. 
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proportionate to the amount involved and to the case's importance.43 
In England, one consequence of trying personal-injury claims 
before a judge and not a jury has been the development of a body of 
decisional authority that discusses the value of various personal injuries. 
The courts have attempted to make similar awards of damages for 
similar injuries. The leading decision of the Court of Appeal on the 
right to a jury trial on a personal-injury claim turned on the premise that 
this scheme of like awards for like injuries should be maintained 
through judge trials.44 The court reasoned that this well-developed body 
of case law on the value of injuries would be upset were juries to make 
awards of damages in personal-injury cases.45 
At common law, neither the trial court nor the appellate court 
could review an issue of fact decided by a jury.46 But the court could 
order a new trial by setting aside the jury's verdict.47 In time, this 
indirect review of a jury's verdict led to the court's "fix[ing] its own 
figure ... without ordering a new trial" when the damages "awarded by 
the jury were manifestly too high or too low."48 The court's power to 
set aside a jury's award of damages was very limited. If the trial judge 
had properly instructed the jury, "it [was] not for the members of the 
Court of Appeal to seek to substitute their assessment and their 
judgment for that of the jury. "49 "The Court of Appeal [could] not 
interfere if the figure [was] one which a jury, acting properly, might 
award. "50 Only if the verdict was "so excessive or so inadequate that no 
twelve reasonable jurors could reasonably have awarded it; or, stated 
otherwise ... [so] out of all proportion to the circumstances of the case" 
could the Court of Appeal set it aside.51 
The Court of Appeal's power to set aside a verdict and order a new 
trial continued to disallow the court to reassess an irrational award of 
43. Civ. P.R. 1.1(2) (2001) (Eng.); BLACKSTONE'S CIVIL PRACTICE, ~ 58.4 at 723 
(Charles Plant et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 2003). 
44. See Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 303 (Eng. C.A. 1965). 
45. Id. The court reasoned that the assessment of damages in personal-injury cases had 
been developed such that the courts awarded like sums for like injuries. See id. at 296. To 
continue this scheme of like awards for like injuries, the trial judge would be required to 
give the jury upper and lower limits for compensation such that "you might as well let the 
judge assess the figures himself." Id. at 303. Under the circumstances, "there is little point 
in having a jury at all." Id. 
46. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 131. 
47. Id. at 135. 
48. Id. 
49. Scott v. Musial, [1959] 2 Q.B. 429, 437 (Eng. C.A. 1959). 
50. Id. at 438. 
51. Id. 
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damages.52 The Court of Appeal could reduce or increase a jury's 
award in lieu of granting a new trial with the consent of the parties.53 
Section 8 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 
By the 1980s, concern emerged that juries' awards in defamation 
actions "appear[ ed] to have got completely out of hand. "54 The Court of 
Appeal had very limited authority to set aside a jury's award of 
damages and almost no power to order a reasonable award of damages 
in place of a new trial. Parliament responded by including in the Courts 
and Legal Services Act 1990 a section providing for the Court of 
Appeal "to have power, in place of ordering a new trial, to substitute for 
the sum awarded by the jury such sum as appears to the court to be 
proper."55 This section applied to those cases "where the Court of 
Appeal has power to order a new trial on the ground that damages 
awarded by a jury are excessive or inadequate."56 The rules of court 
were amended to provide the following: 
In any case where the Court of Appeal has power to order a new trial 
on the ground that damages awarded by a jury are excessive or 
inadequate, the court may, instead of ordering a new trial, substitute 
for the sum awarded by the jury such sum as appears to the court to be 
proper.57 
The Court of Appeal's power to substitute an award of damages for the 
amount awarded in the jury's verdict was novel. But ramifications of 
this change were yet to be felt. 
Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. was the first case to 
explore the significance of the change enacted by Parliament. Rantzen 
was a libel action brought by a television personality against a 
newspaper.58 Rantzen had been tried like other libel cases before it. In 
his instructions to the jury, the trial judge stated that neither he nor 
counsel could suggest to the jury what measure of damages would be 
appropriate. 59 He also explained "that he was not permitted to tell them 
52. INGMAN, supra note 33, ~ 7.9.2, at 232. 
53. Id. 
54. Id.~ 7.9.2, at 228-29. 
55. Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c. 41, § 8(2) (Eng.). 
56. Id.§ 8(1). 
57. R.S.C. Order 59, Rule 11(4) (2000) (Eng.). The new Civil Procedure Rules 
provide: "In an appeal from a claim tried with a jury the Court of Appeal may, instead of 
ordering a new trial, (a) make an order for damages; or (b) vary an award of damages made 
by the jury." Civ. P.R. 52.10(3) (2001) (Eng.). 
58. Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., [1994] Q.B. 670 (Eng. C.A. 1993). 
59. Id. at 681. 
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by way of comparison what awards are received by a plaintiff who has 
been totally or partially paralysed ... or who has lost a limb."60 The trial 
judge's charge on damages continued: 
The figure you come up with, if you get to that point, must be a fair 
and reasonable one. It must not be miserly otherwise suspicion will 
linger. On the other hand, the figure must not be wildly excessive. Be 
reasonable. Keep your feet on the ground. In so arriving at a figure 
you are entitled to take into account the value of money, what it can 
cost to buy a house, a car, or a holiday . . . You will arrive at a 
reasonable figure having balanced out the factors which you think may 
aggravate and so increase the figure and mitigate and so reduce the 
figure.61 
Despite this admonition, the jury awarded £250,000 in damages, a 
considerable award.62 The newspaper af pealed and argued that the 
jury's award of damages was excessive.6 The newspaper contended 
that the jury made an excessive award because the trial judge had not 
provided the jury with any guidance on what amount of damages to 
award.64 
The Court of Appeal first recognized the almost limitless discretion 
accorded to a jury's verdict was no longer satisfactory in light of the 
court's power to substitute its award of damages for that of the jury.65 
Instead, the Court of Appeal then decided to analyze the jury's award of 
damages by asking, "Could a reasonable jury have thought that this 
award was necessary to compensate the plaintiff and to re-establish his 
reputation?"66 The court then asked whether a trial judge, in summing 
up, should provide the jury with further guidance on what sum of 
damages to award. 67 It noted that a juror in another case had written 
about his misgivings over the absence of any real guidance in awarding 
damages: 
It is no betrayal of the secrets of the jury room to confess that, with 
other jurors, I entered the Royal Courts of Justice on 14 June with not 
the remotest idea of what compensation is paid for anything except 
perhaps a dented boot and wing; haloes are outside the normal terms 
of reference. Apparently that is why we were asked. If that is so, the 
60. Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 681 . 
61. Id. at 681 - 82. 
62. Id. at 675. 
63. Id. at 673. 
64. Id. at 673 . 
65. Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 692. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 692-93. 
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court had the outcome it deserved from the appointed procedure. 68 
The Court of Appeal saw three possible sources of guidance for the 
jury: (1) other awards of juries in defamation cases, (2) awards made by 
a court in personal-injury cases, and (3) awards made by the Court of 
Appeal in defamation cases when it substituted its award of damages for 
that of the jury.69 It rejected out of hand the argument that the trial 
judge should refer the jury to awards made by other juries. 70 The Court 
of Appeal also concluded "that there is no satisfactory way in which the 
conventional awards in actions for damages for personal injuries can be 
used to provide guidance for an award in an action for defamation."71 
The court found that awards of the Court of Appeal, presumably in 
defamation cases, "stand on a different footing."72 The court foresaw a 
time when a sufficient body of law would develop from its review of 
jury verdicts in defamation cases so that the trial judge could instruct 
the jury on awards in like cases.73 The Court of Appeal reasoned "that 
it must have been the intention of the framers of the 1990 Act that over 
a period of time the awards made by the Court of Appeal would provide 
a corpus to which reference could be made in subsequent cases."74 The 
decisions of the Court of Appeal could then be relied on by the trial 
judge as establishing reasonable awards in summing up to the jury. 75 
Meanwhile, the process of instructing the jury on damages was left 
in place. 76 The jury could be told to consider the purchasing power of 
any award that it might make.77 Moreover, the trial judge could remind 
the jury "that any award they make [should be] proportionate to the 
damage which the plaintiff has suffered and is a sum which it is 
necessary to award him to provide adequate compensation and to re-
establish his reputation."78 
John v. MGN Ltd. 
The Court of Appeal's approach in the Rantzen case left "judges 
68. Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 693 (quoting THE TIMES, June 15, 1976). 
69. Id. at 693-94. 
70. Id. at 694. 
71. Id. at 695. 
72. Id. at 694. 
73. Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 694. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 696. 
78. Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 696. 
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presiding over defamation trials with juries to confine their jury 
directions to a statement of general principles, eschewing any specific 
guidance on the appropriate level of general damages in the particular 
case." But within two years time, the Court of Appeal recognized "its 
practical disadvantages ha[d] become ever more manifest."79 
A series of jury awards disproportionate to any damage 
conceivably suffered by the plaintiff had given rise to serious and 
justified criticism of the procedures leading to such awards. 80 Judges 
were limited to giving the jury broad directions of general principle 
coupled with instructions to be "reasonable."81 Yet, judges gave no 
guidance on what might be thought reasonable or unreasonable; and it is 
not altogether surprising that juries lacked an instinctive sense of where 
to pitch their awards. They were, in the words of the Court of Appeal, 
in the position of sheep let loose on an unfenced common with no 
shepherd. 82 
John v. MGN Ltd. was a libel action brought by the well-known 
performer, Elton John, stemming from an article published in the 
Sunday Mirror.83 The jury awarded £350,000 in damages.84 On appeal, 
the newspaper's counsel, the same lawyer who had appeared for the 
newspaper on the Rantzen appeal, again suggested that trial judges and 
counsel should be allowed to tell juries about awards of general 
damages in personal-injury cases.85 
The Court of Appeal was persuaded that the guidance being given 
to juries in defamation actions deserved reconsideration. 86 The starting 
point was the court's recognizing that a trial, whether by judge or by 
jury, should give a successful claimant "appropriate compensation, that 
is, compensation which is neither too much nor too little. "87 That said, 
nothing justified the stream "of libel awards in sums which appear so 
large as to bear no relation to the ordinary values of life. "88 
Overgenerous awards were unjust to defendants, encouraged claimants 
to regard a successful libel claim "as a road to untaxed riches," and 
79. John v. MGN Ltd., (1997] Q.B. 586, 60.8 (Eng. C.A. 1995). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 597. 
84. John, [1997] Q.B. at 597. 
85. Id. at 594. 
86. Id. at 611. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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failed to command respect. 89 
Four possible reforms were explored: (1) referring to jury awards 
in comparable actions for defamation; (2) referring to awards either 
approved by or substituted by the Court of Appeal in defamation cases; 
(3) referring to awards of damages in personal-injury actions; and (4) 
allowing counsel to suggest the appropriate award, when coupled with 
the trial judge's guidance on the appropriate bracket. 90 
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that juries should not be instructed 
on previous defamation awards by other juries because "[t]hose awards 
will have been made in the absence of specific guidance by the judge 
and may themselves be very unreliable markers."91 The Court also 
repeated its holding in Rantzen: the trial judge could refer to awards in 
defamation cases either made by or approved by the Court of Appeal. 92 
The court was quick to point out that a body of such awards had not 
been, and would not be, quickly established.93 Meanwhile, another 
approach had to be found. 
The Court of Appeal took a second look at the only other 
alternative: awards of damages in personal-injury cases. It held that 
"judges and counsel, should be free to draw the attention of juries to 
these comparisons. "94 These awards would not be relied on as any 
exact guide, and, of course, there could be no precise correlation 
between loss of a limb, or of sight, or quadriplegia, and damage to 
reputation. 95 
[T]hese personal injuries ... command conventional awards of, at most, 
about £52,000, £90,000 and £125,000 for pain and suffering and loss 
of amenity ... , juries may properly be asked to consider whether the 
injury to his reputation of which the plaintiff complains should fairly 
justify any greater compensation ... .It is in our view offensive to 
public opinion, and rightly so, that a defamation plaintiff should 
recover damages for injury to reputation greater, perhaps by a 
significant factor, than if the same plaintiff had been rendered a 
helpless cripple or an insensate vegetable.96 
In summing up to the jury, both the trial judge and counsel would 
89. John, [1997] Q.B. at 611. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 611-12. The Court of Appeal left open the possibility that it could reconsider 
a trial judge's ability to mention jury awards in comparable cases in the future. Id. at 612. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. John, [ 1997] Q.B. at 614. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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be able to indicate to the jury the amount that it should consider in 
reaching the verdict. 97 Despite these suggestions, jurors should be 
reminded that the final decision on the amount of damages is theirs 
alone to make. 98 
Thompson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
The scheme set out by the Court of Appeal in the John case-that 
the trial judge should instruct the jury on awards in personal-injury 
cases during the summing up in a defamation case-soon was extended 
to claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. In 
Thompson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, the Court of 
Appeal had before it appeals in two cases involving claims for false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. 99 In each case, the trial judge 
gave the jury only general instructions on the amount of damages that it 
might award. The issue on appeal was whether the approach taken in 
the John case, referring the jury to awards in personal-injury cases 
should be applied in jury trials of false-imprisonment and malicious-
prosecution claims. 100 The claimants' counsel argued that referring a 
jury to personal-injury awards, which arise out of negligence rather than 
deliberate acts, does not assist a jury in deciding a police-abuse case. 101 
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal agreed that, because the 
Rantzen and John cases were defamation actions, it did not follow that 
the approach taken in those cases could be applied directly to other 
actions.102 Nonetheless, the court held that the approach set out in the 
John case for instructing the jury on the damages recoverable by the 
claimant would apply to false-imprisonment, malicious-prosecution, 
and other civil actions tried to a jury.103 "Once section 8 of the Act has 
been given one interpretation as to one category of cases that 
interpretation must apply across the board. It is difficult to see how the 
same words can have different meanin§s depending upon the type of 
action to which they are being applied."1 4 
The Court of Appeal set forth the approach that the trial judge was 
97. John, [1997] Q.B. at 615. 
98. Id. at 616. 
99. Thompson v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis, [1998] Q.B. 498 (Eng. C.A. 
1996). 
100. Id. at 502. 
101. Id. at 503. 
102. Id. at 511. 
103. Id. at 511-512. 
104. Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 511-12. 
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to take in instructing the jury at the close of arguments. 105 First, the trial 
judge should explain to the jury that the only relief, it may grant is an 
award of damages intended to compensate the plaintiff for injuries, and 
not to punish the defendant. 106 Next, the trial judge should give the jury 
"an appropriate bracket to use as a starting point." 107 The trial judge 
should decide on the bracket after considering the submissions of 
counsel. 108 The trial judge also should give the jury an appropriate 
upper limit for its award of damages. 109 Finally, the jury should be told 
that these figures "are no more than guideline figures based on the 
judge's experience and on the awards in other cases and the actual 
figure is one on which they must decide." 110 
The John and Thompson judgments have allowed English trial 
judges to provide guidance to juries in civil cases on the amount of 
damages that may constitute an appropriate award. A typical instruction 
may present the jury with a wide range within which to grant the award. 
An example of such an instruction is as follows: 
At the top end in a case of this kind you might think that an award of 
£150,000, something of that order, might be justified. At the lower 
end-but it all depends, really, on your view of the evidence. If you 
were to conclude that this is a case where a significant part of the 
defence of justification has been made good even if the defence does 
not succeed, then you might want to come up with a very small award 
indeed, I do not know. So the lower end of the bracket comes quite 
low if riou feel that to a significant extent the case has not been 
proved. 11 
In other instances, such as police-abuse cases in which the injuries are 
typically slight, the ranges might be as narrow as only a few hundred 
pounds. 112 
Kiam v. MGN Ltd. 
In the John appeal, the Court of Appeal recognized that the jury 
105. Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 514-17. 
106. Id. at 514. 
107. Id. at 515. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 515. 
111. Grobbelaar v. New Group Newspapers Ltd., [2002] 1 W.L.R. 3024, 3028 (U.K. 
H.L. 2002). 
112. See, e.g., Watson v. Chief Constable of Cleveland Police, [2001] EWCA Civ. 
1547, at ,-i 36 (Eng. C.A.); Hill v. Comm'r of Police for the Metropolis, unreported, 
Transcript Nov. 4, 1998 at ,-i,-i 10 & 13 (Eng. C.A. 1998). 
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was not bound by the trial judge's upper and lower limits in making an 
award of damages. 113 The court suggested that, if the jury were to 
return an award outside the suggested bracket, "real weight must be 
given to the possibility that their judgment is to be preferred to that of 
the trial judge."114 
In Kiam v. MGN, Ltd., Victor Kiam, the purchaser of Remington, 
sued the publisher of The Mirror for defamation. 115 In the instructions 
to the jury, the trial judge mentioned that general damages for a 
personal-injury claim would rarely exceed £150,000, that £100,000 was 
the norm for the loss of both arms, and that £45,000 was typical for the 
loss of a hand. 116 In Kiam, the judge instructed the jury as follows: 
Now although, as I seek to emphasise, the decision on damages is 
yours and yours alone, much may depend on the meanings which you 
find that this article bore. But I would suggest that, if you find that the 
article bears the more serious defamatory meanings of the kind 
suggested by Mr. Kiam, you may think that an award of much less 
than £40,000 would not properly reflect the seriousness of the slur on 
him, and the subsequent aggravation of the injury to this feelings. 
You might also think that an award of more than £75-80,000 might be 
considered excessive, given the scale of damages 1enerally. I have to 
stress that the decision is yours and yours alone. 11 
The jury, nonetheless, awarded £105,000. 118 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the jury's award could be 
interfered with only if excessive or inadequate. 119 The proper inquiry 
was "whether a reasonable jury could have thought the award necessary 
to compensate the claimant and to re-establish his reputation." 120 In 
other words, the Court of Appeal "should not interfere with the jury's 
award unless it regards it as substantially exceeding the most that any 
jury could reasonably have thought appropriate."121 The bracket 
suggested by the trial judge was not irrelevant. 122 The jury's role in 
assessing libel damages was such that an award outside the bracket 
should not be condemned as '"unreasonable' unless it is out of all 
113. John, (1997] Q.B. at 616. 
114. Id. 
115. Kiam v. MGN, Ltd., (2003] Q.B. 281 (Eng. C.A. 2002). 
116. Id. at 288. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 287. 
119. Id. at 298. 
120. Kiam, (2003] Q.B. at 298. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 298-99. 
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proportion to what could sensibly have been thought appropriate."123 
IV. APPL YING THE ENGLISH PRACTICE IN NEW YORK 
The preceding review of the law governing the instruction of juries 
and the review of jury awards in civil actions illustrates the magnitude 
of the changes made by the Court of Appeal. In the 10 years after 
Parliament's enacting the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, the 
Court of Appeal replaced a system in which juries were given 
practically no help in placing a value on an injury. The Court of 
Appeal's new procedure allowed trial counsel to suggest an award of 
damages in their closing speeches. The trial judge then provided the 
jury with a bracket that included both a floor and ceiling for reasonable 
compensation. This system, if employed in New York personal-injury 
trials, would be effective. 
There are similarities between the practices followed in England 
and New York in personal-injury jury trials. The principal similarity is 
the power of an appellate court to effectively substitute its award of 
damages for that made by the jury. In England, that power is direct. 
The "Court of Appeal may, instead of ordering a new trial[,] ... vary an 
award of damages made by the jury."124 But in New York, the court 
must order a new trial unless the party affected by the court's decision 
to vary the verdict stipulates to either the increase or the decrease in the 
jury's award. Another similarity shared by England and New York is 
the reviewing court's effective power to substitute its award of damages 
for that made by the jury. This practice has led to the development of a 
body of decisional authority from which general damages for specific 
injuries may be estimated in any case. 
The obvious difference between English and New York jury 
practice is that in England the use of a civil jury is limited to a handful 
of cases and does not include negligence claims, which are the largest 
source of personal-injury awards, a difference of degree and not of 
kind.A jury trial in New York proceeds much like a jury trial in 
England. But an exception is that New York does not follow the 
English practice of the trial judges' suggesting (to the jury) a range of 
damages for injuries. No rule prohibits a New York trial judge from so 
instructing the jury in a civil case. The advantages to such an approach 
suggest that it should be adopted. 
123. Kiam, [2003] Q.B. at 299. 
124. Civ. P.R. 52.10(3) (Eng.); see also Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c. 41, § 
8(2) (Eng.) ("the Court of Appeal ... to have power, in place of ordering a new trial, to 
substitute for the sum awarded by the jury such sum as appears to the court to be proper"). 
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Comparing Section 5501 (c) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules with 
Section 8 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 
19 
The similarities between New York and English practice are most 
easily seen in the legislation authorizing an appellate court to substitute 
its judgment on damages for that of the jury. Section 5501(c) of New 
York's Civil Practice Law and Rules provides that the appellate division 
shall review questions of fact and that: 
[i]n reviewing a money judgment in [a personal-injury action] in 
which it is contended that the award is excessive or inadequate and 
that a new trial should have been granted unless a stipulation is 
entered to a different award, the appellate division shall determine that 
the award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from 
what would be reasonable compensation.125 
Section 8 of England's Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 empowers 
the Court of Appeal "to substitute for the sum awarded by the jury such 
sum as appears to the court to be proper."126 England's Civil Procedure 
Rules provide that the "Court of Appeal may, instead of ordering a new 
trial-( a) make an order for damages; or (b) vary an award of damages 
made by the jury."127 
The differences between the English and New York statutes are 
insignificant. In both jurisdictions, an appellate court has the power to 
set aside the jury's award. Moreover, the standard under which the 
court does so in New York, when an award "deviates materially from 
what would be reasonable compensation" is not much different from 
that applied in England, whether "a reasonable jury [could] have 
thought that this award was necessary."128 Each standard uses 
reasonableness as a guide. 
The principal difference is that a New York court must substitute 
its award of damages for that of the jury under the guise of directing a 
new trial. This legal fiction disguises what really is happening: the 
court is substituting its award for that made by the jury. No difference 
in practice exists between the New York and the English statutory 
framework. Therefore, no difference should exist in the way in which 
the courts apply their powers to control awards made by juries. 
125. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney Supp. 2003). 
126. Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c. 41, § 8(2) (Eng.). 
127. Civ. P.R. 52.10(3)(a)-(b) (Eng.). 
128. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney Supp. 2003); Rantzen, (1994] Q.B. at 692. 
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Judicial Authority Supporting the Trial Court's Charging the Jury on 
the Amount of Damages (How John v. MGN Ltd. Would Be Applied in 
New York) 
Two strains of authority suggest that the English practice of 
charging the jury on fair and just compensation by giving the jury a 
reasonable compensation bracket for a personal injury is consistent with 
the judge's and jury's role in New York. The first line of authority is 
the trial judge's common-law power to comment on the evidence. The 
traditional rule provided that a trial judge, as a matter of discretion, 
could comment on the evidence in the charge to the jury. 129 The judge's 
comments must be proper to guide the jury to a just verdict without 
leading the jury or controlling its verdict. 130 The trial judge could 
suggest that one version of the evidence would prove negligence while 
another version of the events would not. 131 The power to comment on 
the evidence is generally no longer used, although trial judges continue 
to marshal the evidence for the jury in criminal cases. 132 
The second and more modem line of authority allows trial counsel 
to suggest to the jury the amount of damages that may be awarded. 
Lawyers in New York may include an amount of damages in their 
closing arguments if it falls within the damages sought in the action and 
if the method for arriving at those damages is consistent with the court's 
charge.1 33 It is consistent with this authority to implement the English 
practice of charging a jury on damages in New York personal-injury 
cases. 
The trial judge's historical power to comment on the evidence is 
broad enough to support instructing the jury on what range of damages 
is appropriate for a specific injury, should the jury find that injury as a 
matter of fact. In addition, New York attorneys are currently allowed to 
instruct the jury on the amount of their award. The judge is uniquely 
positioned to provide the jury with meaningful and unbiased guidance 
based on judicially approved awards in other cases. Therefore, judges 
should follow the English practice of instructing the jury on reasonable 
129. See Poler v. New York Cent. R.R., 16 N.Y. 476, 483 (1857). 
130. Booth v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 74 N.Y. 15, 27 (1878). 
131. See Drew v. Sixth Ave. R.R., 26 N.Y. 49, 52 (1862). 
132. See, e.g., People v. Sargent, 601 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 
624 N.E.2d 1039 (1993); People v. Cross, 570 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (App. Div.), appeal 
denied, 580 N.E.2d 416 (1991). 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. 
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damages. 
Were New York to adopt the English system of a reasonable-
compensation bracket, the trial judge's charge on damages in a case 
involving a torn medial meniscus followed by two surgeries may 
include the following: 
If you find that defendant is liable, plaintiff is entitled to recover that 
sum of money that will justly and fairly compensate [him] for any 
injury and conscience pain and suffering to date caused by defendant. 
The decision on damages is yours and yours alone. You should, 
however, be aware that the usual compensation for the injury claim by 
the plaintiff-a tom medial meniscus followed by two surgical 
repairs-falls between $200,000 at a minimum and $600,000 (or 
perhaps slightly more) at a maximum. I give you those figures as a 
guide. You are not bound by them and may award either a lesser or 
greater sum of damages should you find such lesser or greater sum 
supported by the evidence. The decision on damages is, I repeat, 
yours and yours alone. 
Before this charge, the attorneys would have submitted suggested 
brackets to the trial judge along with their requests as to the content of 
the charge. 134 Attorneys would know before the closing arguments the 
bracket that the judge intended to use in the charge. This is opposed to 
the current rule under which the lawyers can suggest to the jury, during 
the closing of arguments, awards of damages they think are appropriate 
for the facts of the particular case. 
The Advantages of Adopting the English Practice 
Adopting the English practice in New York presents several 
advantages. Were the jury to make an award within the bracket 
suggested by the court, it is unlikely that trial counsel would move to set 
aside the verdict as either inadequate or excessive. The court would 
have set the bracket only after having heard the lawyers on the range of 
permissible jury awards. In the usual case, the trial judge would not 
examine a verdict within the bracket for either inadequacy or 
excessiveness, which would reduce the grounds for a postverdict 
motion. 
The bracket suggested by trial judge would be based on the 
decisions of the appellate divisions in cases presenting similar injuries; 
therefore, reducing the probability that an appellate court would 
increase or reduce an award within the bracket (absent the trial judge's 
134. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4110-b (McKinney 1992). 
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assigning an incorrect bracket). The appellate division would also have 
the rationale of trial judge on the permissible range of awards in any 
appeal. The result of these changes would be fewer appeals contesting 
the inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict. 
Moreover, even in those cases in which the jury returned a verdict 
on damages outside the bracket, the procedural advantages of the 
system are apparent. The appellate division would have counsel's 
submissions to the trial judge on the proposed bracket, which gives a 
clear picture of the permissible range of damages awards. 
The principal advantage of the English approach is substantive: 
providing like awards for like injuries. In New York, juries are drawn 
from different political subdivisions throughout the state. 135 In some 
areas, juries are known for generous awards, while, in others, jury 
awards are low. Using the English approach and providing the jury with 
a suggested range of permissible damages will not change the tendency 
of a jury in a particular area to be either more or less generous. It is 
suggested that a bracket of permissible damages for an injury should 
reduce the disparity in awards for like injuries in different parts of the 
state. While a jury must judge each claim on its own merits, scant 
justification exists for a jury (which operates as a part of the state court 
system) to award different sums for the same injuries. 
Adopting the English Practice in State-Law Claims Tried in Federal 
Court 
The English practice of providing the jury with a suggested range 
of verdicts for an injury should be permitted (and applied) in a state-law 
based personal-injury claim filed in a court of the United States. Two 
possible obstacles exist. First, the right to a jury trial in a common-law 
claim is guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. 136 
Second, the procedure for instructing a jury at the close of evidence is 
governed by federal law. 137 
Surprisingly, the constitutional issue is easily overcome. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of the Seventh 
Amendment is to preserve the "right [to a jury trial] which existed under 
the English common law when the Amendment was adopted."138 Thus, 
it "preserve[s] the substance of the common-law right of trial by 
jury ... and ... retain[s] the common-law distinction between the 
135. N.Y. JUD. L. §§ 500, 510[1], 520 (McKinney Supp. 2003). 
136. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
137. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. 
138. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). 
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province of the court and that of the jury, whereby .. .issues of law are 
to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined by the 
jury under appropriate instructions by the court."139 The Seventh 
Amendment does not preserve a particular form of trial or procedure so 
long as the judge decides the issues of law and the jury resolves the 
questions of fact. 140 Under this construction of the Seventh 
Amendment, a trial judge's suggesting a range of damages awards to a 
jury would not infringe a litigant's Constitutional right to a jury trial. 
The jury would still decide the factual issue of damages, albeit guided 
by the trial judge.141 
The more difficult question is whether federal law allows the trial 
judge to suggest the range of damages to the jury in the instructions on 
damages. Well-established authority suggests that "[i]n charging the 
jury, the trial judge may not suggest a proper award by way of allusion 
to a particular sum."142 The power of a federal trial judge to comment 
on the evidence is more firmly rooted than is the power of a New York 
judge to do so. 143 In this view, the federal trial judge "an active 
participant in the trial" whose role is to guide and lead the jury.144 
While a federal trial judge is should not be permitted to mention a 
"particular sum" of damages as appropriate, the judge should be 
permitted to suggest a range of permissible damages so long as the jury 
is reminded that it is the sole trier of fact and is free to disregard the 
bracket suggested by the court. 145 
139. Baltimore & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 657. 
140. Id. 
141. Cf Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 429 (1996) (requiring 
a federal court to apply C.P.L.R. 5501(c) in the trial and the appeal of a state-law claim 
because the section is a substantive rule designed to achieve predictability in awards of 
damages in actions tried to a jury). 
142. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2556, at 446 (2d ed. 1995). 
143. Id. § 2557, at 451; 1 KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS § 7.05, at 498-99 (5th ed. 2000); see, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia & 
Reading R.R., 123 U.S. 113, 114 (1887) ("Trial by jury in the courts of the United States is 
a trial presided over by a judge, with authority ... to instruct the jury upon the law, but also, 
when in his judgment the due administration of justice requires it, to aid the jury by 
explaining and commenting upon the testimony, and even giving them his opinion upon 
questions of fact, provided only that he submits those questions to their determination."); 
Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886) ("In the courts of the 
United States, as in those of England, from which our practice was derived, the judge, in 
submitting a case to the jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks it necessary to assist 
them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the evidence, call their attention to 
parts of it which he thinks important, and express his opinions upon the facts"). 
144. O'MALLEY, supra note 142, § 7.05, at 499. 
145. See id.§ 7.05, at 500--01. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
If properly applied, the English system of providing the jury with a 
reasonable-compensation bracket does not eliminate the jury's role in 
awarding damages, a necessarily nuanced and highly individualized 
determination in every case. Rather, the trial judge's giving the jury a 
bracket with an upper and lower end indicating what is fair and 
reasonable compensation in a case should provide the jury with valuable 
guidance on what amount of damages is reasonable under the 
circumstances of the case. The jury would be free to make a higher or 
lower award than that indicated by the bracket, just as it now may make 
an award that is higher or lower than that suggested by trial counsel. 
If the English practice were properly applied in New York, the 
court's suggesting a reasonable-compensation bracket to a jury in a 
personal-injury case should lead to the eventual evening out of jury 
awards for like injuries throughout the state. In tum, these equitable 
awards will be perceived as increasing fairness in the courts by granting 
like awards for like injuries. Moreover, litigants and their attorneys will 
be better able to assess the jury's likely award in a case because parties 
should assume that a jury's award of damages will fall inside the ... 
bracket in most cases. Because the jury's award is apt to fall inside the 
bracket, the number of postverdict motions to set aside the verdict for 
inadequacy or excessiveness (and appeals from orders on those 
motions) would be reduced. In other words, much would be gained by 
the adoption of the English practice of providing the jury with a 
reasonable-compensation bracket in New York in personal-injury cases. 
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